THE CONTROVERSIAL WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF LT. COL. A M IYORSHE INDICTING GENERAL MAMMAN VATSA AND OTHERS OF PLOTTING TO OVERTHROW BABANGIDA

Introduction

In Nigeria, beginning in the first week of December 1985 over one
hundred
airforce, army and naval officers were arrested enmasse for allegedly
plotting to overthrow the 4 month old government of Major General
Ibrahim
Babangida who had himself come to power on August 27, 1985 in a
palace coup
against Major General Buhari

After a Preliminary Special Investigation Board, Major General Mamman
Vatsa
and 16 others were tried at the Brigade of Guards HQ in Victoria
Island,
Lagos, by a Special Military Tribunal beginning on Monday 27th
January 1986.
Separately, Brigadier M. Nassarawa and Wing Commander Uku were also
tried on
different charges.  The Tribunal was constituted under the Treason
and other
offences (Special Military Tribunal) Decree No. 1 of 1986.

The Coup - Lt. Col Iyorshe's Testimony

Lt. Col. A M. Iyorshe was investigated by an SIP team led by Captain
Christopher Olufunsho Otunlana, who was at that time Commanding
Officer of
the Strategic Intelligence Support Group.   Iyorshe had been brought
to
Lagos from Kaduna. Beginning on Dec 21, 1985, he was confronted at a
location in Ikoyi in a number of interviews by the SIP and provided
with a
questionnaire to complete.  After "cautionary statements written in
the
english language" (which is the military equivalent of miranda
rights), he
was asked to make written statements freehand.  A tape recorder was
also
used to record the interviews with him but those tapes later became
the
subject of controversy because of concerns that they had been
doctored.  In
fact during one attempt to play a tape by the prosecution they
discovered
that the speed of the standard tape player in the court was such that
the
tapes could not be played back, indicating that a high fidelity
system using
a different speed was used to make the recordings (or tamper with
them) -
which immediately caused suspicion.  Col. Iyorshe himself repeatedly
opposed
any tape being used expressing concern that he had spoken with a
twisted
voice which could hardly be proven to be his.  Further he said he did
not
sign any tape.

 


WRITTEN TESTIMONY

"1.    I, Lt. Col. A. M. Iyorshe, having been duly cautioned in the
Emglish
Language that I am not obliged to say anything unless I wish to do
so, that
whatever I say may be taken in writing and may be given in evidence.
I,
therefore, elect to state as follows:

2.    I made contact with Lt. Col. CA Oche sometime in October on
matters
affecting the nation.  We discussed in general terms what was, we
felt, a
betrayal of the military, the amount of national issues and court
action,
the general indiscipline including the armed forces and tribalism.
Other
things included the blanket release of the political prisoners; the
release
of Dantata and his associates, who it was established, was guilty of
cocaine
trafficking.  There were also cases of millions of money salted away
in
foreign countries, incompetence in the military and lack of
professionalism.

3.    We then agreed that there ought to be a change in the country.
Our
discussions were with Lt. Col Bitiyong, who in fact called me to
Lagos in
the first place.  Bitiyong was in possession of documents which he
believed
were used to spirit away millions of pounds all in the name of
equipment
maintenance agreements on behalf of the armed forces i.e. the Army.
We were
unhappy that such series of coups where certain individuals featured
always
left a bad impression on the minds of young officers and that it
legitimizes
coups in the Armed Forces.  With those documents above, which showed
all the
details, Bitiyong, Oche and I met to discuss the matter.  We also
believed
that leadership was by example. So those who led the nation cannot
have
their children abroad while other citizens struggled to educate their
children in the country.

4.    Back in Kaduna, I discussed the matter with Major Bamidele,
also of
the Command and Staff College Jaji.  He also joined and agreed to
participate in any attempt to overthrow the government.

5.    There were other contacts which I made in Makurdi, usually Wing
Commander Ben Ekele; he also agreed and later brought in Wing
Commander
Sakaba.

6.  There was only one useful meeting which was held in Makurdi (Col.
S.V.L.
Malu's Guest House).  Nothing concrete was discussed; there were
disagreements on dates; conduct of operations, logistics and above all
troops.  The meeting ended up by dividing areas of responsibility
such as
the operations cell, political and propaganda cell, the economic cell
and
logistics.  The main problem of the group was mere finance and troops
as
most of us had no command. It was during this discussion that Lt. Col.
Bitiyong informed us that Maj. Gen Vatsa had been responsible for the
litttle so far used in travelling and the accomodation in Makurdi.
Although
most of us did not want any senior officer involved, we eventually
agreed
that since we lacked the finance, Maj Gen Vatsa's sponsorship would be
accepted.  We, therefore, worked out the requirements which Bitiyong
was to
take to Vatsa.  It had since been realised that Vatsa was able to
provide
N50,000 presumably to Bitiyong.

7.    The operational aspect was to involve the Army and the Air
Force and
probably the Nigerian Navy.  It was not agreed on how it should be
carried
out, but Bitiyong suggested that the President was to be arrested and
confronted with solid facts.  He was then to make a public
announcement
relinquishing his position and was to be granted safe custody either
internally or to any country of his choice.  But we also considered
the
possibility of an all out fight if things did not work out assumed. I
still
insist that there was no concrete operational plan.

8.    There were no other meetings that involved the whole group, but
Bitiyong and I met again to compare notes.  There was not much to
compare
and it was later disclosed that things were not promising in Lagos
area.

9.    The various groups referred to in paragraph six have up to now
not
submitted any report.

10.    What I personally feel is that the nation itself needed a
better
deal.  There have always been people whose only ambition is to lead,
not
serving any national interest.  There has always been individual,
tribal or
business rights, never the rights of this nation to a better image;
social,
economic, political and military programs and plans.  Nigeria
deserves a
group of people or leaders transparently honest enough to publish all
their
assets and liabilities on the pages of newspapers for the world to
see. Not
a nation where anybody will be allowed to have a foreign bank account
let
alone the millions stored away.   The nation should be such that any
Nigerian regardless of his tribe or religion will have the right to
aspire
to the leadership or rulership of the country.  Nigeria was fast
sinking to
a state of despondency and anarchy.  They never and still never trust
their
leaders.  The anarchy at our airports characterises the state of the
nation.
Corruption is rife in this country and transcends all spheres of
life.  It
is something the nation has to solve. Professional incompetence and
mediocrity are rewarded whereas hard work is mocked.

11. Within the military, the situation was and still is very tense.
The
welfare of soldiers is totally neglected such that soldiers still
live in
batchers over ten years after the civil war; no uniforms, no drugs in
the
hospitals; soldiers are being subjected to too much guard duties,
little or
no chance to themselves and their families.  The discipline in the
army in
particular was deteriorating rapidly as exemplified by the report of
what
happened in Lagos on August 27th, 1985.

12.  The question of leadership was not discussed quite seriously,
but it
was with one exception, felt that the army had always dominated
leadership.
This was not an issue any way as there were no solid plans regarding
such
things, the method of operation and the question of finance.  I never
considered myself for any higher military or political appointments.
In
fact, at first, all of us believed that if we succeeded, some senior
officers of honesty would be called to rule.  Personally up till quite
recently, I never believed that coups solve any problem or else Libya
would
be paradise on earth.  But then things semed to get worse and worse.

13. Throughout these months, I kept Lt. Col. ME Effiong informed of
everything and we discussed issues about the nation in general.
Another
person who did not know that I belong to a group that was willing to
join
any group that  i knew about, was Lt. Col IG Usman.  He was quite
willing to
participate in any change of government.

(Sgd)  Lt. Col. MA Iyorshe
21/12/85"