THE SECESSION ATTEMPT OF MURTALA MUHAMMED
Murtala Muhammed was born in Kano on November 8, 1938. Like many of his northern colleagues in the army, he attended Barewa College in Zaria. He began his military training in 1959 and was commissioned into the Nigerian army as a second lieutenant in 1961. Like so many Nigerian army officers of his generation including future Head of State Yakubu Gowon, he trained at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst in England. Early in his career, Murtala was taught military tactics by an eloquent and intelligent Oxford University educated officer named Chukwuemeka Ojukwu. Little did teacher and student realise that one day, they would end up as protagonists on opposing sides of the battlefield.
In 1962, Murtala served as a member of the Nigerian led UN peacekeeping force in the Congo. That UN peacekeeping force was later commanded by Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, who would subsequently become Nigeria’s first military Head of State. Murtala specialised in the army’s signals corps and was stationed in Lagos where his Uncle: Inua Wada served as the Federal Government’s Defence Minister. The emotionally volatile Murtala first came to prominence after Nigeria suffered what was to prove the first of many military coups, on January 15th 1966. Had a group of young army Majors not overthrown the civilian government of Tafawa Balewa, most Nigerians would never have heard the name “Murtala Muhammed”.
THE FIVE MAJORS
Murtala was in Lagos when a young and charismatic instructor at the Nigerian Military Training College in Kaduna named Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu (“an incorruptible idealist without ambitions of power, in many ways a man born before his time” – see Muffett – “Why They Struck”) killed the premier of the northern region: Ahmadu Bello. After a group of young army officers (including Nzeogwu) toppled the civilian government in a violent military coup d’etat, Nzeogwu was in de facto control of the northern region of Nigeria. Tense negotiations were conducted via intermediaries, between Nzeogwu and the General Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army: Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi. In the ensuing melee, Ironsi emerged as Nigeria’s first military Head of State. After a few days of these negotiations, Nzeogwu, wearing his trademark white scarf, emerged to address reporters. He agreed to hand over the administration of the northern region to the officer hand picked by Ironsi: the newly promoted Lt-Colonel Hassan Usman Katsina. He also agreed to surrender to, and come to Lagos in the company of Lt-Colonel Conrad Nwawo (an officer trusted by Nzeogwu and who had been recalled from his post as Nigeria’s military attaché in the United Kingdom for this purpose). Murtala was among the troops who along with Nwawo took Nzeogwu from Kaduna to Lagos. However, Murtala’s co-operation with Ironsi’s regime and policies did not last long after this episode.
As the pattern of killings during the January 15th coup emerged, northerners (including Murtala) became convinced that the coup had been targeted specifically at them when it became evident that the four highest ranking northern officers in the Nigerian army: the “astute and articulate” Brigadier Maimalari (see Madiebo – “The Biafran Revolution and the Nigerian Civil War”), the acting Chief of Staff at army headquarters Colonel Kur Mohammed, the Adjutant-General Lt-Colonel James Pam, and the commanding officer of the 4th battalion Lt-Colonel Abogo Largema, had been murdered during the coup. In an attempt to dismiss charges of an anti-northern agenda, Ironsi with great courage surrounded himself with northern soldiers and promoted northerners to some sensitive military posts. He had northern bodyguards and a northern ADC. He also appointed Lt-Colonel Yakubu Gowon to replace Colonel Kur Mohammed as the Chief of Staff at army headquarters, and Mohammed Shuwa was promoted to Lt-Colonel and selected to replace Lt-Col ‘Emeka’ Ojukwu as the commander of the 5th battalion in Kano. Murtala himself was promoted to Lt-Colonel and appointed as the Nigerian army’s inspector of signals.
However, Murtala and his northern colleagues were still not happy and were further infuriated when they learnt of the promotion of several Igbo officers, and worse still, that some of these Igbos has been promoted to occupy the posts previously held by the northern officers slain in January. Murtala made no secret of his dislike of Ironsi’s actions. In an outspoken outburst in the presence of Igbo officers, Murtala referred to Ironsi as a “fool” and made it clear that he would take steps to avenge the deaths of his northern officer colleagues. The anger of northern troops at the perceived Igbo bias of Ironsi’s regime was such that there was an undeclared consensus among them that they too would stage their own coup, except this time, Igbos would be the victims of such a coup. Once this consensus was reached, Murtala became the effective leader of the northern faction in the Nigerian army. Using his sensitive position as the inspector of signals, northern soldiers met at Murtala’s Lagos house to plan for their “July rematch” with Igbo soldiers.
While Igbos suspected that northerners were planning a revenge coup, northerners were convinced that Igbo soldiers were planning a second coup to finish them off. Lt-Col Patrick Anwunah openly confronted Murtala with the accusation that he was planning a northern led coup. The two had an angry exchange of words. Anwunah hoped that the confrontation would convince Murtala to drop his coup plan. It had the opposite effect. Realising that the plot had leaked, Murtala decided that he had to strike immediately. This allied to wild conspiracy theories of a grand Igbo design to annihilate northerners convinced northern soldiers that they had to take pre-emptive action. At their lowest level, these theories claimed that Igbo soldiers were planning to kill all remaining northern soldiers, and at their highest level, that Igbos were planning to kill all northern males whether military or civilian. That many northern soldiers believed these stories must be taken into account when assessing the brutality of their response to Igbos.
THE “JULY REMATCH”
Murtala and other northern soldiers had lost so much faith in the Nigerian federation, that they now wanted to break the northern region out of Nigeria. This intention was personified by the codename of their revenge coup: operation “Araba” (an Hausa term meaning “separate us” – presumably separation from the rest of Nigeria).
When the northern revenge coup began on July 29 1966, Murtala coordinated events from Lagos and led a team of soldiers who took over the international airport at Ikeja. In a remarkable irony, the same airport which he had taken over by force was named after him a decade later. Airplanes were hijacked by northern soldiers in order to ferry their families back to the north in anticipation of the northern region’s exit from Nigeria. At the airport itself, an Igbo officer (Captain Okoye) was captured by Murtala’s troops at the airport, tied to an iron cross, beaten and left to die in the guardroom. In military units at Lagos, Ibadan, and Kaduna, northern troops mutinied and murdered their Igbo colleagues in frightening and gruesome reprisals for the Majors’ coup in January. The Head of State, Major-General Ironsi, was kidnapped, beaten and shot by soldiers including men from his own security detail. Other incidents of shocking brutality took place across the country as northern soldiers rose up and slaughtered hundreds of their Igbo colleagues.
After their blitzkrieg, the senior northern soldiers in Lagos retreated to Ikeja cantonment. The most senior surviving officer left in the army – Brigadier Ogundipe, dared not risk an open confrontation with them given the mood they were in. He instead sent the Chief of Staff, Army, Lt-Colonel Gowon to go to Ikeja cantonment to bargain with the mutineers. When Gowon arrived, he was placed under arrest on the orders of Murtala. Murtala and the other northern soldiers were suspicious of Gowon’s high profile role in Ironsi’s regime. Eventually the northern soldiers were joined by British diplomats and senior civil servants who engaged them in a lively debate. Murtala became the spokesman of the northern soldiers and he was vociferous and uncompromising in his insistence that the north should secede from Nigeria. He argued passionately for the secession of the north and declared that the northern soldiers would observe a “ceasefire” only when their conditions had been met. Namely –
the repatriation of northerners and southerners to their respective regions of origin
the secession of the northern region from Nigeria.
The civilians disagreed with Murtala’s secession plan and urged him to drop it. The British and American ambassadors (Sir Francis Cumming-Bruce and Albert Matthews respectively) were effective at convincing middle belt officers that the north would have most to lose from a break up of Nigeria since they would lose access to the sea, become landlocked, and be cut off from federal revenues accrued in the South. Gowon and other middle belt officers were the first to become convinced by this line of argument. They were especially anxious to avoid replacing their fear of Igbo domination in a United Nigeria, with Hausa-Fulani domination in a northern state. However, they had now reached a dead end because while planning their revenge coup, they had formulated no political objective for Nigeria as a whole other than to get back at Igbos for their part in the death of northerners in January. This was displayed by a comment made by Lt-Colonel Joe Akahan following the northerners’ revenge coup when he remarked that there would be no more killing by northern soldiers “since events had now balanced out”. However, the stance of the civilians and foreign diplomats presented them with a state of affairs they were unprepared for. They now had to find a way of reconciling the orgy of violence, with the continued corporate existence of Nigeria.
Murtala Muhammed was born in Kano on November 8, 1938. Like many of his northern colleagues in the army, he attended Barewa College in Zaria. He began his military training in 1959 and was commissioned into the Nigerian army as a second lieutenant in 1961. Like so many Nigerian army officers of his generation including future Head of State Yakubu Gowon, he trained at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst in England. Early in his career, Murtala was taught military tactics by an eloquent and intelligent Oxford University educated officer named Chukwuemeka Ojukwu. Little did teacher and student realise that one day, they would end up as protagonists on opposing sides of the battlefield.
In 1962, Murtala served as a member of the Nigerian led UN peacekeeping force in the Congo. That UN peacekeeping force was later commanded by Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, who would subsequently become Nigeria’s first military Head of State. Murtala specialised in the army’s signals corps and was stationed in Lagos where his Uncle: Inua Wada served as the Federal Government’s Defence Minister. The emotionally volatile Murtala first came to prominence after Nigeria suffered what was to prove the first of many military coups, on January 15th 1966. Had a group of young army Majors not overthrown the civilian government of Tafawa Balewa, most Nigerians would never have heard the name “Murtala Muhammed”.
THE FIVE MAJORS
Murtala was in Lagos when a young and charismatic instructor at the Nigerian Military Training College in Kaduna named Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu (“an incorruptible idealist without ambitions of power, in many ways a man born before his time” – see Muffett – “Why They Struck”) killed the premier of the northern region: Ahmadu Bello. After a group of young army officers (including Nzeogwu) toppled the civilian government in a violent military coup d’etat, Nzeogwu was in de facto control of the northern region of Nigeria. Tense negotiations were conducted via intermediaries, between Nzeogwu and the General Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army: Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi. In the ensuing melee, Ironsi emerged as Nigeria’s first military Head of State. After a few days of these negotiations, Nzeogwu, wearing his trademark white scarf, emerged to address reporters. He agreed to hand over the administration of the northern region to the officer hand picked by Ironsi: the newly promoted Lt-Colonel Hassan Usman Katsina. He also agreed to surrender to, and come to Lagos in the company of Lt-Colonel Conrad Nwawo (an officer trusted by Nzeogwu and who had been recalled from his post as Nigeria’s military attaché in the United Kingdom for this purpose). Murtala was among the troops who along with Nwawo took Nzeogwu from Kaduna to Lagos. However, Murtala’s co-operation with Ironsi’s regime and policies did not last long after this episode.
As the pattern of killings during the January 15th coup emerged, northerners (including Murtala) became convinced that the coup had been targeted specifically at them when it became evident that the four highest ranking northern officers in the Nigerian army: the “astute and articulate” Brigadier Maimalari (see Madiebo – “The Biafran Revolution and the Nigerian Civil War”), the acting Chief of Staff at army headquarters Colonel Kur Mohammed, the Adjutant-General Lt-Colonel James Pam, and the commanding officer of the 4th battalion Lt-Colonel Abogo Largema, had been murdered during the coup. In an attempt to dismiss charges of an anti-northern agenda, Ironsi with great courage surrounded himself with northern soldiers and promoted northerners to some sensitive military posts. He had northern bodyguards and a northern ADC. He also appointed Lt-Colonel Yakubu Gowon to replace Colonel Kur Mohammed as the Chief of Staff at army headquarters, and Mohammed Shuwa was promoted to Lt-Colonel and selected to replace Lt-Col ‘Emeka’ Ojukwu as the commander of the 5th battalion in Kano. Murtala himself was promoted to Lt-Colonel and appointed as the Nigerian army’s inspector of signals.
However, Murtala and his northern colleagues were still not happy and were further infuriated when they learnt of the promotion of several Igbo officers, and worse still, that some of these Igbos has been promoted to occupy the posts previously held by the northern officers slain in January. Murtala made no secret of his dislike of Ironsi’s actions. In an outspoken outburst in the presence of Igbo officers, Murtala referred to Ironsi as a “fool” and made it clear that he would take steps to avenge the deaths of his northern officer colleagues. The anger of northern troops at the perceived Igbo bias of Ironsi’s regime was such that there was an undeclared consensus among them that they too would stage their own coup, except this time, Igbos would be the victims of such a coup. Once this consensus was reached, Murtala became the effective leader of the northern faction in the Nigerian army. Using his sensitive position as the inspector of signals, northern soldiers met at Murtala’s Lagos house to plan for their “July rematch” with Igbo soldiers.
While Igbos suspected that northerners were planning a revenge coup, northerners were convinced that Igbo soldiers were planning a second coup to finish them off. Lt-Col Patrick Anwunah openly confronted Murtala with the accusation that he was planning a northern led coup. The two had an angry exchange of words. Anwunah hoped that the confrontation would convince Murtala to drop his coup plan. It had the opposite effect. Realising that the plot had leaked, Murtala decided that he had to strike immediately. This allied to wild conspiracy theories of a grand Igbo design to annihilate northerners convinced northern soldiers that they had to take pre-emptive action. At their lowest level, these theories claimed that Igbo soldiers were planning to kill all remaining northern soldiers, and at their highest level, that Igbos were planning to kill all northern males whether military or civilian. That many northern soldiers believed these stories must be taken into account when assessing the brutality of their response to Igbos.
THE “JULY REMATCH”
Murtala and other northern soldiers had lost so much faith in the Nigerian federation, that they now wanted to break the northern region out of Nigeria. This intention was personified by the codename of their revenge coup: operation “Araba” (an Hausa term meaning “separate us” – presumably separation from the rest of Nigeria).
When the northern revenge coup began on July 29 1966, Murtala coordinated events from Lagos and led a team of soldiers who took over the international airport at Ikeja. In a remarkable irony, the same airport which he had taken over by force was named after him a decade later. Airplanes were hijacked by northern soldiers in order to ferry their families back to the north in anticipation of the northern region’s exit from Nigeria. At the airport itself, an Igbo officer (Captain Okoye) was captured by Murtala’s troops at the airport, tied to an iron cross, beaten and left to die in the guardroom. In military units at Lagos, Ibadan, and Kaduna, northern troops mutinied and murdered their Igbo colleagues in frightening and gruesome reprisals for the Majors’ coup in January. The Head of State, Major-General Ironsi, was kidnapped, beaten and shot by soldiers including men from his own security detail. Other incidents of shocking brutality took place across the country as northern soldiers rose up and slaughtered hundreds of their Igbo colleagues.
After their blitzkrieg, the senior northern soldiers in Lagos retreated to Ikeja cantonment. The most senior surviving officer left in the army – Brigadier Ogundipe, dared not risk an open confrontation with them given the mood they were in. He instead sent the Chief of Staff, Army, Lt-Colonel Gowon to go to Ikeja cantonment to bargain with the mutineers. When Gowon arrived, he was placed under arrest on the orders of Murtala. Murtala and the other northern soldiers were suspicious of Gowon’s high profile role in Ironsi’s regime. Eventually the northern soldiers were joined by British diplomats and senior civil servants who engaged them in a lively debate. Murtala became the spokesman of the northern soldiers and he was vociferous and uncompromising in his insistence that the north should secede from Nigeria. He argued passionately for the secession of the north and declared that the northern soldiers would observe a “ceasefire” only when their conditions had been met. Namely –
the repatriation of northerners and southerners to their respective regions of origin
the secession of the northern region from Nigeria.
The civilians disagreed with Murtala’s secession plan and urged him to drop it. The British and American ambassadors (Sir Francis Cumming-Bruce and Albert Matthews respectively) were effective at convincing middle belt officers that the north would have most to lose from a break up of Nigeria since they would lose access to the sea, become landlocked, and be cut off from federal revenues accrued in the South. Gowon and other middle belt officers were the first to become convinced by this line of argument. They were especially anxious to avoid replacing their fear of Igbo domination in a United Nigeria, with Hausa-Fulani domination in a northern state. However, they had now reached a dead end because while planning their revenge coup, they had formulated no political objective for Nigeria as a whole other than to get back at Igbos for their part in the death of northerners in January. This was displayed by a comment made by Lt-Colonel Joe Akahan following the northerners’ revenge coup when he remarked that there would be no more killing by northern soldiers “since events had now balanced out”. However, the stance of the civilians and foreign diplomats presented them with a state of affairs they were unprepared for. They now had to find a way of reconciling the orgy of violence, with the continued corporate existence of Nigeria.
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